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In Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior, the Navajo Nation 
challenged the Department of the Interior’s 2001 and 2008 water 
allocation guidelines and asserted that under NEPA and the APA the 
guidelines violated the Navajo Nation’s water rights. The Navajo Nation 
also asserted a breach of trust claim against the United States. After nearly 
a decade of attempted settlement negotiations, the Navajo Nation 
reasserted its complaints. The District Court for the District of Arizona 
denied the Navajo Nation’s motions, and the Navajo Nation appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which determined the Navajo Nation 
lacked standing, leaving the Navajo Nation’s water rights unadjudicated 
and unquantified.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1868, the Navajo Nation (“Nation”) was established by treaty.1 
The United States has a fiduciary duty arising from its trust obligation to 
protect the Nation’s land and resources—including the Nation’s water 
rights; however, the Nation’s water rights have yet to be quantified.2 The 
Nation challenged the Department of the Interior’s (“DOI”) Surplus and 
Shortage Guidelines3 (collectively, “Guidelines”) for water allocation in 
the Colorado River basin.4 The Guidelines dictate how the Secretary of the 
Interior (“Secretary”) shall allocate water to the lower basin states in times 
of surplus and shortage.5 The Nation argued that the Guidelines violated 
the Administration Procedure Act (“APA”) and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) because the Guidelines failed to 
adequately consider the Nation’s water needs and violated the United 
States’ fiduciary duty to the Nation.6  Neither the United States District 
Court for the District of Arizona nor the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reached the merits of the case.7 As a result, the 
Nation’s water rights have yet to be adjudicated, and the water in the 
Colorado River Basin continues to be highly coveted.8  
                                                          
1. Navajo Nation v. Dep’t. of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1152 (9th  
Cir. 2017).  
2. Id.  
3. Id. (The Surplus Guidelines were promulgated in 2001 and the  
Shortage Guidelines in 2008). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1157. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 1156. 
2 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
 
 
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Nation lives on the largest Indian reservation in the United 
States and is the largest non-federal riparian land owner along the 
Colorado River, which lies almost entirely within the drainage of the 
Colorado River basin.9 Although the water needs of the Nation is evident, 
the Nation’s water rights have yet to be quantified.10 Due to the highly 
contested and pervasive management of the water in the Colorado River 
basin, the procedural history of this case spans several decades.11  
 
A. The Law of the River 
 
The seven states in the Colorado River basin formed the 1922 
Compact (“Compact”) to ensure that the Colorado River was a regular, 
dependable source of water.12 The Compact divided the seven affected 
states of the Colorado River into the upper and lower basin.13 Lower basin 
states included Arizona, California, and Nevada.14 The terms of the 
Compact entitled the lower basin states to 7.5 million acre-feet of water 
per year (“mafy”). It also ensured that the rights within the states would 
not change, and the United States’ fiduciary duty to the tribes would not 
be altered.15  
The introduction of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (“BCPA”) in 
1928 set into motion the construction of the Hoover Dam to improve water 
allocation in shortage years.16 In 1929, BCPA became effective after the 
upper and lower basin states, with the exception of Arizona, ratified the 
Compact.17 Because Arizona failed to ratify the Compact, the mafy 
numbers previously negotiated under the Compact did not become 
immediately effective.18 However, the Compact authorized the Secretary 
to enter into water contracts with California, Arizona, and Nevada, which 
held them to their 4.4, 2.8, and 0.3 mafy allotments, respectively.19 Water 
allotment disputes continued between California and Arizona, until 
Arizona sued California in 1952.20 Out of this dispute came the 1964 
Decree, which reaffirmed the BCPA mafy numbers for California, 
Arizona, and Nevada, and reserved to the Secretary the power to apportion 
the Colorado River waters. The Guidelines were a result of this power.21  
                                                          
9. Id. at 1152. 
10. Id.  
11. Id. at 1153. 
12. Id. at 1153 
13. Id.  
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1154.  
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
2018  NAVAJO NATION V. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR  3 
 
The United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California further 
affirmed the Winters Doctrine, holding that the United States impliedly 
reserved the waters necessary to achieve the primary purpose of a 
reservation when it withdrew the land.22 The 1964 Decree used the Winters 
Doctrine to adjudicate and quantify the water rights of five Native 
American Tribes when partitioning the Colorado River, but the Nation was 
not among the five.23 The Nation asserted that it too had federally reserved 
water rights to the Colorado River because “the United States impliedly 
reserved for the Nation ‘the waters without which their lands would [be] 
useless.’”24 The Nation has yet to have its water rights definitively stated.25  
 
B. Procedural History 
 
The Secretary adopted the Colorado River Interim Surplus 
Guidelines (“Surplus Guidelines”) in 2001 to establish how a surplus of 
water would be allocated.26 The Nation, along with the Colorado River 
Basin Ten Tribes Partnership, opposed the Surplus Guidelines.27 They 
submitted comments stating the Surplus Guidelines were fundamentally, 
deeply, and fatally flawed, and not only did they fail to quantify the 
Nation’s water rights in the lower basin, but they lacked consideration for 
Indian trust assets.28 The Secretary dismissed these complaints by stating 
that the Surplus Guidelines would not alter tribal entitlements.29 
Displeased with the Secretary’s statement and unsatisfied with the 
Surplus Guidelines, in March of 2003, the Nation filed a complaint against 
the DOI, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(collectively “Federal Defendants”).30 The Nation alleged that the United 
States breached its obligation to protect the Nation’s water rights, and that 
the Secretary’s promulgation of the Surplus Guidelines violated NEPA 
and APA standards.31 State and local government entities from the lower 
basin states intervened as defendants, and litigation was stayed in October 
2004 to reach a settlement agreement.32 However, the parties never 
reached an agreement, and the stay postponed the Nation’s water rights 
from being adjudicated for nearly a decade.33 
                                                          
22. Id. at 1155; See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S.Ct. 1468,  
10 L.Ed.2d 542 (1963); See Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 84 S.Ct. 755, 11 
L.Ed.2d 757 (1964). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 1156. 
25. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963); See  
Arizona v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); See also Cappaert v. United States, 
426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). 
26. Nation, 876 F.3d at 1157. 
27. Id 
28. Id. at 1158. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 1159. 
31. Id. at 1159-60. 
32. Id. at 1159-60. 
33. Id. at 1160. 
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In 2008, the Secretary promulgated Shortage Guidelines.34 In 
2013, the stay was lifted, litigation resumed, and the Nation amended its 
complaint twice to properly challenge the new Shortage Guidelines.35 
The district court held that the Nation’s NEPA claims lacked standing 
and that sovereign immunity barred the Nation’s breach of trust claims 
against the United States.36 After the district court dismissed the Nation’s 
complaint without leave to amend and without prejudice, the Nation filed 
a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from final judgement.37 The Nation 
argued that because the statute of limitations had already run, the district 
court’s dismissal acted more like a dismissal with prejudice.38 Further, 
the district court denied the Nation’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.39 On appeal 
to the Ninth Circuit, the Nation challenged the district court’s holdings of 
both orders.40  
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Nation’s arguments 
regarding: (1) its standing, (2) its breach of trust claims in regard to 
sovereign immunity, and (3) it’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from 
judgment.  
 
A. Standing 
 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nation failed to establish it 
had suffered an injury and thus did not have standing to sue.41 To arrive at 
this conclusion, the court first assessed whether the Nation had standing 
to bring a NEPA claim.42 For a plaintiff to establish standing, three 
elements must be met: (1) a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury 
must be present; (2) the defendant’s challenged conduct must have caused 
the injury; and (3) it must be likely that a decision in the plaintiff’s favor 
would cure the injury.43 However, because the Nation alleged a procedural 
injury, the standard for immediacy of the injury was relaxed.44 The Nation 
only needed to prove that via a chain of events it would have been 
“reasonably probable” that an injury could have resulted.45  
The Nation asserted its first procedural injury was due to the fact 
that the Guidelines did not quantify the Nation’s water rights and 
                                                          
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id.  
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 1162. 
42. Id. at 1161. 
43. Id. at 1160. 
44. Id.  
45. Id. (See Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341  
F.3d 961, 975 (9th Cir. 2003) (established the “reasonably probable” standard)). 
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disregarded the Nation’s reserved rights under Winters.46 The court held 
that the Nation failed to establish it had standing under the first alleged 
injury because the chain of events it posited was too speculative, was not 
supported by any facts, figures, or data, and failed to show how the 
Guidelines would have “impede[d] the ascertainment and declaration of 
the Nation’s Winters rights.”47  
The Nation also asserted that until the Nation’s water rights were 
quantified, the Nation’s water needs would not be met. Although the court 
found this alleged injury more persuasive, it too was insufficient to convey 
standing.48 Water constraints already in effect under the BCPA and the 
1964 Decree apportioned water amounts, and the Guidelines merely 
dictated when there was a surplus or shortage.49 Therefore, it could not be 
established that the Guidelines independently caused procedural injury to 
the Nation.50 
 Further, the court held that the Nation unraveled its own argument 
by citing cases that reiterated the standard that a plaintiff “must identify 
how the challenged action threatens, to a reasonable probability, some 
separate interest.”51 Here, the Nation failed to show how the Guidelines 
threatened “the Nation’s unadjudicated water rights or its practical water 
needs.”52 Therefore, because of the aforementioned mistakes, the court 
affirmed that the Nation’s NEPA claims lacked standing.53  
 
B. Sovereign Immunity 
 
The court further addressed the issue of sovereign immunity. The 
United States can only be sued if it consents, or its immunity is waived.54 
Before the court could hold whether 5 U.S.C. § 702 waived the United 
States’ sovereign immunity, and to what extent § 704 limited the waiver 
to final agency action claims, it had to reconcile its own conflicting 
opinions.55 It analyzed the holdings in Presbyterian Church v. United 
States and Gallo Cattle Co. v. U.S Department of Agriculture.56 The 
former case held that § 702 did not limit the waiver of sovereign immunity 
to cases that challenged agency action, while the latter case held that § 702 
                                                          
44.  Id.  
48.  Id. at 1162-64. 
49.  Id. at 1165. 
50.  Id. at 1166. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. at 1166-67. 
53.  Id. at 1167. 
54.  Id.  
55.  Id. at 1168-69 (See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 
(1941)). 
56.  Id. at 1168. 
57.  Id. at 1170-71 (discussing Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United  
States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989); Gallo Cattle Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 159 
F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
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contained several limitations, such as the final agency action requirement 
of § 704.57  
The court concluded that Gallo Cattle was valid for cases dealing 
with APA causes of action, and Presbyterian Church was valid where the 
case dealt with non-APA claims and sovereign immunity.58 Therefore, the 
district court’s dismissal of the Nation’s breach of trust claim based solely 
on sovereign immunity was inappropriate and the court remanded the 
Nation’s claim with permission to amend.59  
 
C. Rule 60(b)(6) Relief from Judgment 
 
Finally, the court evaluated whether the district court’s denial of 
the Nation’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion to amend its pleadings was an abuse of 
discretion.60 The court agreed with the Nation’s assertion that once the 
statute of limitations had run, a dismissal without prejudice acted like a 
dismissal with prejudice.61 However, because the Nation failed multiple 
times to amend its complaint before final judgment, the court held that the 
district court acted within its discretion when it refused the Nation’s Rule 
60(b)(6) motion—a motion reserved for extraordinary circumstances.62 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 The Nation ultimately failed to establish that it had standing 
because it did not prove that the Guidelines had caused it injury. Although 
the Nation’s water rights were not adjudicated, this case reconciled the 
court’s conflicting precedent concerning APA § 702 waiver of sovereign 
immunity and its previously held limitations. The Nation will not be 
entitled to amend its complaint for its NEPA claims. However, the Nation 
will get a second chance to amend and retry its breach of trust claim, and 
perhaps finally have its water rights adjudicated and quantified. This case 
serves as a valuable lesson to other Indian nations that they must formulate 
water rights claims that can easily survive both standing and sovereign 
immunity. 
                                                          
58.  Id. at 1172 (See Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 525; See Gallo  
Cattle Co., 159 F.3d at 1198). 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. at 1172-73. 
61.  Id. at 1173-74. 
62.  Id. at 1173-74. 
63.  Id. at 1174. 
